This article proposes a game theoretical setting to explain the fragmentation of majority and opposition coalitions in governments. The model consists in a two-stage framework: (1) the leaders of each coalition control the size of the parties composing the groups so as to maximise the political power of their coalition, and (2) the political party leaders within each coalition decide of their participation level in the collective action of their coalition. The main conclusion is that a relationship between the concentration of the two opposite coalitions should exist when the competition between them is fierce. This finding is found to be empirically true for the left-wing and righ-wing coalitions in the case of French local governments, evidencing the existence of a competition in fragmentation among these coalitions.
Introduction
There are mainly two kinds of explanations to the number of parties that compete in a given polity, both being rooted in Duverger (1954) . The first emphasises the role that preexisting social cleavages can play on political heterogenity and how the preferences of the mass actors affect the electoral coordination of the political coalitions in competition (Duverger, 1954; Neto and Cox, 1997 and Cox, 1997) . The second is interested in how institutions can structure coalitional incentives. Social heterogeneity may increase the number of parties that compete in a given polity but only when the electoral system is sufficiently permissive (Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1990; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994, among others) . For instance, according to Duverger's (1954) law, a plurality rule election system would tend to favor a two-party system while a double ballot majority system and proportional representation would tend to multipartism.
From a theoretical point of view, the paradigm of citizen-candidates initiated by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) provides an illustration of the problem: under their settings, policy preference differences and electoral institutions have been proven to determine the equilibrium number of candidates who will choose to run. This framework has been quite extended recently (see Dhillon, 2004 for a survey). Two categories of studies can be distinguished, depending on whether individuals are motivated to form parties for (1) pre-electoral considerations, i.e., in order to win elections (Osborne and Tourky, 2002; Riviere, 2004) or (2) post-electoral considerations, i.e., in order to pass a proposal (Jackson and Moselle, 2002; Levy, 2004; Bandhopadhyaya and Oak, 2004) . The basic tenet of these models is that a group of politicians will constitute a party when all members support (or compromise on) the same position. As such, these models explain why individuals are distributed among 'parties'-they do not, however, focus on the way parties may interact within a 'coalition'.
The present paper departs from this literature by proposing a game theoretical framework to explain the fragmentation of majority and opposition coalitions in governments. Our theory starts from two intuitions. First, the relatively more fragmented a political coalition is, the lower its effective political power. This statement is mostly due to the fact that parties within a coalition may behave non-cooperatively as regards the resources they get from or give to the coalition. These non-cooperative behaviors bring some inefficiency that hinders the power of the coalition and is all the more important than the coalition is fragmented (see Le Maux et al., 2011) . This hypothesis is backed by some empirical evidence, for instance Rattsø and Tovmo (2002) , Ashworth and Heyndel (2005) , Padovano and Venturi (2001) , Le Maux et al. (2011) , Le Maux and Zhang (2012) . Second, we assume that fragmentation does exist because political concentration is costly. Having a concentrated coalition in government means that parties have to form electoral alliances. Such agreement is not costless. For instance, two parties belonging to the same bloc can agree to present a common candidate. This agreement brings some frustration both for the militants and for the politicians of at least one of the two parties. Merging parties may be even worse in terms of cost for militants and politicians (see Blais and Indridason, 2007) , or for the electorate of a particular constituency (Levy, 2004) .
The first part of our paper presents our idea in a formal way. The focus is on two political coalitions (e.g., left-wing versus right-wing) that are in competition for political power. The model consists in a two-stage framework: (1) the leaders of each coalition control the size of the parties composing the groups so as to maximise the political power of their coalition, and (2) the political party leaders within each coalition decide of their participation level in the collective action of their coalition. We deduce two main propositions from this model. First, the more concentrated a coalition is, the higher its effective political power. Second, the fragmentation of a majority coalition in government is positively correlated to the fragmentation of the opposition coalition. The second part of the paper provides an empirical analysis of our second proposition in the case of the French départements. Using instrumental variable estimators, we find empirical evidences that are in line with our model: the less fragmented the right-wing (left-wing) majorities, the less fragmentated the left-wing (rightwing) oppositions. This finding evidences the existence of a competition in fragmentation between the left-wing and right-wing coalitions at the local level in France. Furthermore, we find out that this result mostly holds when the contest between the two blocs in competition is close.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the estimation strategy and provides the empirical results. We conclude in section 4.
Competing over political power
Consider a parliament where two groups, labeled Coalition A and Coalition B, compete for political power (e.g., to increase the chances of passing a proposal, to maximize their bureaucratic power, to have the possibility of rent-seeking, or to secure important positions in the government). We denote n A and n B the number of politicians in Coalition A and Coalition B. We assume that each coalition is respectively composed of P A and P B parties. The number of politicians of Party p in Coalition K, p = 1, . . . , P K , is denoted n K p with ∑ P K p=1 n K p = n K for K = A, B. Our basic framework is that of a two-stage game:
1. Pre-electoral stage: in this stage, we assume that the leaders of Coalitions A and B are able to influence the degree of concentration of their coalition, i.e., how the seats are distributed among the parties. The choice variables are α K p = n K p /n K , where α K p is the share of politicians of Party p in Coalition K (for K = A, B and p = 1 . . . P K ). Modifying the concentration degree of a coalition may have two effects. First it may change the number of elected politicians and, once elected, it may also affect the participation of the parties in the coalitions' political activities.
2. Post-electoral stage: in this stage, knowing their size, each party has the possibility to free-ride on the collective action of their coalition. The participation to the coalition's activity is assumed to be costly because the party's resources could be devoted elsewhere (e.g., to support the party's leader or to secure seats in other elections). Let e K p ≤ n K p define the number of politicians of Party p in Coalition K that participate in Coalition K's political activities (K = A, B), at a given cost. For a given concentration degree (determined in the pre-electoral stage), each party leaders of each coalition will choose a participation level in the coalition activities.
The theoretical model can be solved using backward induction. The link between the number of politicians in the pre-electoral stage and the post-electoral stage is treated as a black box. However, we can view this treatment as an application of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis: the way a coalition is fragmented during an electoral campaign will necessarily have an impact on the way the coalition is fragmented in the parliament. Similarly, a large coalition of parties is likely to be more represented in the parliament than a small-size coalition, even if some information is unforeseeable at the time the expectations are formed.
Subsection 2.1 focuses on the second stage of the model, namely the political party leaders' game. We show that the political power of a coalition not only depends on its fragmentation but also on the fragmentation of the opposite coalition. Taking this into account, Subsection 2.2 solves the first stage of the game, the coalition leaders' game, and concludes to a positive relationship between the fragmentation of Coalitions A and B.
2.1. Post-electoral stage: the political party leaders' game
The presentation of this stage is derived from Le Maux et al. (2011) . The political power a coalition has depends on the number of its members who take an active part in the coalition political activities. The total amount of participation of each coalition is defined as ∑ 
i.e., the effective political power, π K , of Coalition K increases as the number of active politicians of the coalition increases. The political party leaders are the players in this post-electoral stage. We assume that the leaders can give directives or instructions to their party members as regards their implications in the coalitional activities. We can assume for instance that the time devoted to the collective action of the coalition could be allocated to other activities such as the party's campaign, thus generating a cost to the party members. More specifically, party leader p of Coalition K chooses the number of active party members, e K p , so as to maximize the Party's payoff. The payoff function is the difference between Coalition K's political power π K and the cost of participation of Party p. This function is written as follows:
where λ > 1 (to ensure that the second order conditions are met). After a few computations, we obtain the subgame Nash equilibrium participation level of Coalition K (see Le Maux et al. (2011) for a detailed presentation):
and where 
and π B (e A * , e B * ) = 1 − π A (e A * , e B * ).
From Equation 4 we can see that the way the seats are distributed within the coalitions, i.e., x K , plays an important role in our model. Function x K may be rewritten as:
where
Therefore, a change in x K resulting from a shift of politicians from Party j to Party i is given by:
The sign of partial derivative 6 is positive if and only if α K i > α K j . It means that a shift of politicians from a smaller to a bigger party within coalition K always increases x K . In other words, the more concentrated a coalition is, the higher is the value of x K . This result allows us to provide a precise definition of 'fragmentation'in our paper: Coalition K gets less fragmented, if there is a shift of politicians from a smaller to a bigger party within K.
Moreover, with respect to Equation 4
, it is easy to see that Coalition A's effective political power, π A , is an increasing function of the ratio x A /x B , thus leading to the following proposition: Proposition 1. A shift of politicians from a smaller to a bigger party within Coalition K always increases x K . Since π K is increasing in x K , the more concentrated a coalition is, the higher its effective political power, ceteris paribus.
It follows from Proposition 1 and Equation 4 that the political power of a Coalition is negatively related to its fragmentation but positively related to the fragmentation of the opposite coalition.
Pre-electoral stage: the coalition leaders' game
In this stage, the leaders of Coalitions A an B choose their fragmentation degree by knowing that a higher concentration increases their effective political power (according to Proposition 1) and also changes the number of elected politicians. At the same time, a higher concentration reduces the satisfaction of politicians and militants. As stated in the introduction, merging parties or presenting common candidates somehow frustrates politicians and militants. For this reason we assume that becoming more concentrated is costly. In other words, more concentration brings some benefit to the coalition (in terms of political power) but also some cost to the stakeholders of the coalition (for example in terms of individual political achievements).
Formally, and for sake of simplicity, we assume that the leader of Coalition A chooses the coalition's fragmentation x A = x A α A 1 , . . . , α A P A by solving the following optimization program:
where c A denotes the concentration cost function with dc A /dx A > 0. The Lagrangian of the optimization problem may be written as:
The partial derivative of L with respect to α A p , p = 1, . . . , P A , is given by:
By substitution and rearranging, we obtain:
n A is the elasticity which measures the sensitivity of the number of elected politicians to the coalition concentration. Equation 10 characterizes the optimal response of Coalition A's leader to any change in Coalition B's fragmentation. By proceeding similarly, we compute the reaction function of Coalition B:
By using Equations 10 and 11 we obtain an optimal condition that has to be met at the subgame 6 perfect Nash equilibrium:
which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, there exists a link between the concentration of Coalition A and that of Coalition B.
Our theory states that in a right-left bloc formation, the number of parties and the way the politicians are distributed within the parties have an impact on the political power of the blocs. If a coalition gets more concentrated, because the cost of concentration has decreased, this coalition also becomes more politically powerful, which may trigger a reaction from the opposite bloc in terms of concentration. This gives rise to what we term a "competition in fragmentation".
In practice however, it should be stressed that competition in fragmentation is likely to happen when the electoral margin of the majority coalition is weak, i.e., when n A is close to n B . If a majority coalition has a large electoral margin, it will not take care much about the opposition. If the opposition gets more concentrated there will be no reaction from a majority with a large electoral margin. As a result, there might be no correlation between fragmentation of majority and opposition coalitions when the share of seats held by the majority is high. To some extent, our model also offers this result for a given number of seats in the council, say n = n A + n B . In that case, when n A tends to n, n B will tend to zero and the political power of Coalition A will be equal to π A = 1. The program of Coalition A's leader becomes max 1 − c A x A , i.e., the concentration level x A will reach its lowest level no matter what. Moreover, the model has been solved based on a continuous framework, as if the legislature size, i.e., n A + n B , was sufficiently large. In a discrete framework, however, the possibility of fragmentation is almost null when n A or n B tend to zero.
For instance, if a coalition has only one seat, x K is necessarily equal to (1) ; and so on. In other words, for a given legislature size, the positive relationship between x A and x B stated in Proposition 2 is expected to be observed mostly when the contest between the coalitions is sufficiently close.
Lastly, depending on the value of the cost parameter λ , the power of a coalition may be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes. If λ = 2, Coalition K's political power π K is increasing with its Herfindahl index:
power increases with the size of the largest party of the coalition, i.e., max α K 1 , . . . , α K P K . This is known as the best-shot rule in the economics of conflict literature (Le Maux and Rocaboy, 2012) . These two indexes, Herfindahl and Best-shot, are used to test our theory in the following section.
Empirical evidence from the French départements councils
In this section we conduct an empirical investigation of the main conclusions of our model. We focus on panel data from the départements which represent the second tier of local governments in France. Due to the many tasks assigned to these jurisdictions, their overall economic importance is considerable. In particular, they have been conferred responsibility for several welfare programs that substantially contribute to the size of the government (e.g., protection of single mothers and children, social assistance for the disabled, aid to pensioners and the elderly, social welfare for the unemployed). Subsection 3.1 introduces the empirical specification and provides a description of data. Subsection 3.2 discusses the empirical strategy. Subsection 3.3 presents some preliminary tests. Subsection 3.4 gives the estimation results. Subsection 3.5 examines wether we have estimated reaction functions or a correlation between fragmentation indexes at the Nash equilibrium.
Specification and description of data
We use a data set of 93 French départements over 7 election years (1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2011) . The départements are divided into electoral constituencies known as cantons. On average there are 40 cantons per département. Each département is administered by a General Council (Conseil Général). There is a representative per canton to the General Council. General Councillors (Conseillers Généraux) are approximatively elected for a term of six years. The elections, referred to as Elections cantonales (Cantonal elections), are held every three years on average and are sometimes organized the same year as other elections in order to reduce organizational costs. The Councillors are elected by means of direct vote by the electorate according to a two-ballot, uninominal majority polling procedure. An important specificity of these elections is that only half the councillors are renewed at each election, with one councillor per constituency. A candidate securing the votes of at least 25% of the canton's registered voters and more than 50% of the total number of votes is elected. If no political candidate satisfies these conditions, then a second round of voting is held one week later. Entitled to present themselves in the second round are the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the first round, plus any other candidate or candidates who received the votes of at least 10% of those registered to vote in the canton. In the second round, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes is elected.
A General Council is generally made of two or three coalitions. Each coalition is composed of parties sharing the same ideology. Roughly speaking there are left-wing, center and right-wing coalitions. Within a coalition there are often discussions among the parties of the coalition to appoint the candidate who will have to stand for election. Depending on the conclusion of these discussions, the General Council will be more or less fragmented. For instance, if the discussions lead to appointing politicians of the same party, the coalition will not be fragmented at all. In contrast, if there is an equal sharing of appointments among all the parties of the coalition, the latter might be highly fragmented. Table 1 provides the political partition used to conduct the empirical strategy. The leftwing coalition has seen a notable improvement of its seat share over time. The increase between the 1994-and 1998-Cantonal elections (more than a 10%-difference on average) may be explained by the unpopular program of welfare reforms proposed by the right-wing Prime Minister Alain Juppé in 1995. The increasing unpopularity of the center provides also an explanation to the trend in the left-wing's share of seats. The centrist parties have seen a permanent decrease in their share of seats over years, while the share of seats on the right has remained relatively constant. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the distribution of seats for each département. Each jurisdiction is displayed seven times, corresponding to the seven election years. In our sample, 38.06% of the observations are left-wing governments, i.e., councils where leftist parties hold a majority of seats (displayed in black). In contrast, only 1.84% of the départements have a majority of seats on the center (displayed with a cross). Lastly, 26.96% of the départements are on the right (displayed in gray), while the remaining percentage, i.e., 33.14%, stands for minority governments where no coalition holds a clear-cut majority of seats (displayed in black circle).
According to our theory, there should be a relationship between the concentration of the left-wing coalitions (denoted by left hereafter) and that of the right-wing ones (right) in the département councils. This relationship may be expressed by Equations 10 and 11. In that case, we suppose that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has not been reached yet and we estimate reaction functions. We can also assume that the Nash equilibrium has been reached and estimate Equation 12. In both cases, there exists a correlation between the concentration of the competing coalitions. The empirical model tested in this paper is as follows:
where A, B = right, left and B = A.
Subscript i and t refer to département and year. Variable n denotes the total number of seats in the département council and n A the number of seats held by Coalition A. Variables x A and x B denote the concentration index of Coalitions A and B, respectively. In the model, when λ = 2, x k is the Herfindahl concentration index of Coalition K. When λ → 1 + , x K is the best shot concentration index, i.e., the share of seats of the coalition largest party. These two indexes will be used in our empirical study as a measure for x right and x left . The Φ are the coefficients to be estimated. Notice that our empirical analysis will not focus on the fragmentation of centrist coalitions and this, for three reasons. First, a significant number of départments do not have any seats on the center, which makes impossible the computation of our concentration indexes. Second, even when the center is present in a council, the number of political parties is generally close to 1, with a concentration index equal to 1, which makes impossible the estimation of a relationship between fragmentation indexes. Third, it should be stressed that centrist parties are generally cooperating with the right-wing or the left-wing coalitions depending on the ideology of their leader. For instance, the centrist party 'Union for French Democracy' (UDF) was at its creation a powerful right-wing party that defeated the Socialist François Mitterrand during the French Presidential elections. Afterwards, the UDF made a couple of collaborations either with the left or the right for strategic reasons or ideological matters. It is obviously impossible for the empirical analysis to take into account all the political affinities of each centrist politician. For these reasons, the centrist parties are excluded from our analysis. They may of course have an impact on the relationship between the fragmentation of the right-wing and that of the left-wing. We will actually take into account this potential impact via structural break estimations (see Subsection 3.3). For computational reasons, we also have excluded two observations from our sample (one département for two years), because there was no council seats on the right. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel of (7 years) × (93 départements) − 2 = 649 observations. Summary statistics for these observations are provided in Table 2 . Over the whole sample, on average, the Herfindahl index takes the value of 0.54 and 0.56 for the left-wing groups and the right-wing groups respectively. The Best-shot index i.e. the seat share of the largest party within the left-wing coalitions is equal to 68.3% on average, while it takes the value of 63.6% for the right-wing coalitions. Over the seven years of our study, the average number of parties within a coalition is equal to 3.00 for the left-wing bloc and to 2.39 for the right-wing bloc. Figure 2 gives an insight into the disparities among the départements. The number of parties on the right goes from 1 to 5, while for the left, it ranges from 1 to 7. The distribution of the concentration variables as measured by our two indexes are depicted on Figures 3 and 4. 
Empirical strategy
The number of political parties in a coalition exhibits low variation over time. As such, adding individual fixed effects could remove much of the time variation necessary for obtaining good coefficient estimates (Beck, 2001) . This is why we do not focus on the Within estimator. Since the Pooled-OLS estimator may lead us to omitted-variable biases (biased and inconsistent estimates), we use geographical dummies instead of individual fixed effects. This solution offers a compromise between the Pooled-OLS estimator and the Fixed-effects estimator and allows to take into account the potential impact of regional specificities. We have regrouped the 93 départements into six areas, as shown in Table 3 . We also have included time dumies in our specification. These variables are denoted y 94 t , y 98 t , ..., y 11 t . Their coefficients represent the overall impact of each Cantonal election, and other events as well, on the endogenous variable, ceteris paribus.
Depending on whether we are at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the relationship between x right and x left may be symmetric or not. We consequently need to estimate two specifications, namely x left = f x right , . . . and x right = f x left , . . . , which represent the leftwing and the right-wing reaction functions, respectively (see Equation 13 ). Because of that, our variables of interest appear both on the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the empirical specification. Ignoring this endogeneity problem can lead to inconsistent estimates. To account for simultanous causality, the empirical models are estimated using the 2SLS method. Good instruments must be exogenous and correlated with x right and x left . Our instrumental variables consist of all the explanatory variables plus a set of additional variables that could explain social cleavages and political fragmentation:
1. According to Meltzer and Richard (1981) , higher inequality of market incomes among voters should be associated with higher levels of political support for redistributive policies. This result could also be extended to labor market regulations (Saint-Paul, 1996) or public consumption (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) . The political spectrum could also be determined by the voting behavior of interest groups. Lobby groups could mobilize their members and make them vote for a given candidate (e.g. Uhlaner, 1989) . To take into account these possibilities, we include the following variables as possible instruments: the mean taxable income, the share of unemployed people, and the share of student in secondary school.
2. There might be a connection between social cleavage and population density. For instance, more densely populated regions could create more opportunities for social advancement and could lead to more egalitarian societies (Sylwester, 2003) . This is why we introduce the population density as well as the population among our instrumental variables. We use the usual Sargan test to check for the validity of our instruments, i.e., to check whether they are truly exogenous.
In Equation 13, the inclusion of n A in the empirical specification has two purposes. First, as stated by Equations 10, 11 or 12, this variable should have an impact on the concentration of Coalition A. Moreover, n A can also be used to control for the impact of mechanical effects on the concentration indexes. As a matter of fact, the concentration index is likely to increase as the coalition's number of politicians decreases (e.g., at the limit, if there is only one politician, the Herfindahl index and the Best shot index are both equal to one). A way to highlight this phenomenon is to plot the concentration indexes of each coalition as a function of their number of seats. Figure 5 displays this relationship for both the Herfindahl and Best shot indexes (both per year and per départment), respectively. The bold curves represent the average value of the relative concentration estimated through local regressions (see Wand and Jones, 1995) . Although the effect is not so obvious for the left-wing, it is apparent from these figures that mechanical effects exist. In particular, when the number of seats is very small, it leads necessarily to an increase in the concentration of the coalition. Because of these potential mechanical effects, introducing the number of seats in Equation 13 can be helpful. According to our theory, the relationship between the fragmentation indexes should exist when the contest between the three blocs is close. Even if they represent a less powerful coalition, the centrist parties may have an impact on the interactions between the right-wing and left-wing coalitions. To capture the intensity of the competition between the three blocs, we compute the following index: I = 27 × (seat share of the left) × (seat share of the center) × (seat share of the right). (14) This index ranges from 0 to 1. Hereafter, we will be referring to this index as 'conflict index'. It is equal to 0 when at least one coalition is not present in the political spectrum, and equal to 1 when each coalition holds one third of the total seats. We expect the relationship between the fragmentation of the left and the right to be stronger as conflict increases, i.e., when I gets closer to 1. We use Sample splitting methods to test for these hypotheses in the next subsection.
Tests for structural change
To test for the possible impact of I on our estimates, we employ two different econometric tools:
1. Breakpoint tests. We test for the presence of structural changes with endogenous thresholds using the empirical approach devised among others by Zeleis et al. (2003) .
Once the data have been ordered by a variable (here, I), the test confronts the null hypothesis in which the coefficients are constant all along the sample against the alternative hypothesis that at least one coefficient varies over the sample, revealing the presence of a threshold. This test is somewhat similar to a Chow test, except that it is done for each possible break, and that the selection of the threshold is made using the asymptotic p-values computed with the algorithm proposed by Hansen (1997).
2. Recursive regressions. If the previous approach can show the existence of a general breakpoint in the data, as well as the optimal value of the threshold, it does not however give the variation of the estimated coefficients. To overcome this, we test Equation 13 by dividing our sample in quantiles of 200 départements of increasing conflict index (see also Guengant et al. 2002 for an example of this approach). Figure 6 presents the results of the endogenous threshold estimation, for both indexes and each estimated equation, i.e, x right = f x left , . . . and x left = f x right , . . . . On these graphs, the continuous horizontal line represents the Hansen's (1997) asymptotic value below which the significance of the threshold is rejected, at a 10% significance level. The black curve represents the statistic of the test, while the grey curve gives the value of the conflict index for each possible subdivision. As can be seen, significant thresholds are found (maximum values of the statistic), located approximately at I = 0.4 and I = 0.2, thus suggesting instable estimated coefficients.
Similar results are found with recursive regressions. The estimates of coefficient Φ 1 (black curve) and their confidence interval (grey areas) are reported on Figure 7 for each equation, and both concentration indexes, i.e., Herfindhal and Best shot. We find that there is a positive and significant relationship between the fragmentation of the right-wing and left-wing coalitions when the conflict index is higher than 0.4 (I > 0.4). These results suggest again that we should divide our sample into two sub-samples: one with the départments where the conflict index is low (Regime 1) and the other where I is high (Regime 2). The iso-curve for I = 0.4 is displayed on Figure 1 . The départements belonging to the set inside the isocurve have a I greater than 0.4 (367 départements), those outside have a I lower than 0.4 (282 départements). Tables 4 and 5 give the estimated coefficients of equation 13 in the two regimes for x left and x right respectively. These tables present the second stage of the 2SLS estimation procedure.
Estimations results
As regards the instruments (first stage regressions), the F-test statistic provided at the bottom of the tables presents the result of an F-test for instrument relevance in the IV regression. As we can see, this statistic is significant which highlights the good explanatory power of the instruments. In addition, the Sargan test allows to check whether the instruments satisfy the conditions required for their application. If the test statistic exceeds the critical value we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least some of the IVs are not exogenous. We can see that this statistic is not significant at the 5% significance level, which means that the instruments are valid. As such, the estimation results for the second stage regressions may be readily interpreted.
From Table 4 , we see that the fragmentation of the left-wing coalitions x left is positively correlated with the fragmentation of the right-wing coalitions in Regime 2, i.e., when conflict is high. The coefficients of x right are statistically significant at the 5% significance level for the herfindahl index and at 1% for the Best shot. Their values are equal to 0.4482 and 0.4854, respectively. To comment on these results, let us consider the case where the coalitions' members are equally distributed among the parties, with 5 parties of equal size in each coalition. In that case, a decrease in the number of left-wing parties from 5 to 3 (i.e., an increase in the Herfindahl index from 1/5 to 1/3) may approximately lead to a decrease of 1 party on the right (i.e., an increase in the Herfindahl index from 1/5 to 1/5 + (1/3 − 1/5) × 0.4482 ≈ 1/4). Similarly, an increase in the share of seats of the largest left-wing party from 20% to 40% will generate an increase in the share of seats of the largest left-wing party from 20% to approximately 20% + 20% × 0.4854 ≈ 30%. The relationship between the fragmentation of each coalition is consequently not to be neglected. In Regime 1, when the conflict index is lower than 0.4, the estimated coefficient Φ 1 is not significant for both indexes, pointing out that fragmentation interactions between right-wing and left-wing coalitions do exist but only when the conflict among the coalitions is high.
From Table 5 , we can see that the fragmentation of the right-wing coalitions x left is also positively correlated with the fragmentation of the left-wing coalitions. When the conflict is high, the coefficients of x right are statistically significant at the 1% significance level and higher than previously (0.5537 and 0.7423, respectively). It follows from this result that the magnitude of the reaction of the right-wing coalitions is higher than that of the left-wing coalitions. Again, in Regime 1, when the conflict is low, the estimated coefficient Φ 1 is not significant. Lastly, when they are significant, the coefficients of variables n and n A exhibit the expected negative sign: increasing the number of council seats and of seats of the coalition increases its fragmentation.
Reaction functions vs Nash equilibrium
We have estimated the coefficients of equations which correspond either to reaction functions or to a correlation between concentration indexes at the Nash equilibrium. These equations are reaction functions if the relationships between x right and x left is not symmetric in Regime 2. An easy way to control for this is to check whether the coeficient Φ 1 estimated in Table 5 is significantly different from 1/Φ 1 in This finding suggests that we have estimated reaction functions. By using these estimates, we have computed the set of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, for each département in Regime 2, at the average values of the exogenous variables. Figures 8 and 9 describe the average values of the indexes (in grey), in contrast with the Nash equilibrium (in black). While some départments lie below their equilibrium level, others are above; this result indicates that some coalitions should be more concentrated in the future while some others should be more fragmentated, ceteris paribus. Besides, we can observe a positive correlation between the equilibrium values of the leftwing indexes and those of the right-wing ones, leading support to Proposition 2. Overall, the coordinates of the Nash equilibria belong to the interval [0; 1] which supports the consistency of our estimates.
Conclusion
In the present paper our goal has been to demonstrate that the number and size of competing parties is an important element of the contest between opposite political blocs. We have first presented a theory explaining how the fragmentation of a coalition partly determines the fragmentation of the opposition coalition: there should be a trade-off, within a coalition, between its effective political power in government (which is positively related to its concentration) and the individual satisfaction of politicians and militants (which is decreasing with the concentration of the coalition). As a result, there may exist an optimal fragmentation level. Since the coalitions are in competition, this optimal level may be determined by the fragmentation of the opposite coalition.
We have tested our theory by studying the correlation between the fragmentation of leftwing and right-wing coalitions within the French départment councils. Contrary to studies focusing on Duverger (1954)'s law (see, e.g., Clark and Golder, 2006) , we examine the determinants of political fragmentation within the same electoral system. By focusing on a panel data set of 7 elections and 93 local French governments, we show that there is a statistically significant relationship between the concentration index of right-wing coalitions and that of left-wing coalitions, but only when the competition between the competing political coalitions is high. As a matter of fact, these findings suggest that a competition in fragmentation occurs when our conflict index, defined as the product of coalitions' seat shares, is higher than 0.4. For a lower index, no fragmentation interaction happens.
Such results are coherent with the view that the formation of coalitions does not only depend on the voting system, whether it is a plurality rule or a proportional rule system, as in Duverger (1954) , but also on the contest between competing coalitions within a given voting system. The main implication of our results is that the political fragmentation of one coalition (due to social cleavages for instance) can exacerbate the fragmentation of the other coalition. Our results also bring a new perspective as regards the debate about the number of elected representatives in a given polity. According to the 'weak government hypothesis' (Roubini and Sachs, 1989) or 'the law of 1/n' (Bradbury and Crain, 2001) , the larger the number of politicians, the more difficult it would be to secure cooperation in a government. In this paper, we argue that this is not necessarily true, since a raise in the seats in one coalition may also negatively affect the number of parties in the other coalition.
Yet, several questions remain unanswered. First of all, our theoretical framework has treated the link between the pre-electoral stage and the post-electoral stage as a black-box. It is however important to understand how the expected outcome of an election affect the way politicians cooperate during election periods. Second, the model does not explain the emergence of a political leader in the coalition, neither the role centrist politicians may have on the fragmentation of the left-wing and right-wing blocs. A deeper focus on politicians' incentives from this aspect seems also important. Lastly, with a larger database about the citizens' characteristics, we could determinate more precisely the exogenous determinants of political fragmentation. How does the distribution of voters shape the number of political parties in competition? What are the exogenous factors in society that influence the number of candidates who will chose to run? These remaining questions open up new directions for future empirical and theoretical studies. 
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